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IS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
OBSOLETE?-RESTATING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN FUNCTIONAL TERMS
John M.A. DiPippa*
INTRODUCTION
We are in the midst of a technological revolution. Surveillance
devices are becoming smaller and more sophisticated and, there-
fore, easier to hide and more useful.' We provide an enormous
amount of information about ourselves to the Government, all of
which is stored and cataloged.2 While much of this information
previously existed, it was poorly organized and access to it was dif-
ficult.3 Today, the capability to organize and retrieve this informa-
tion is at hand." At the same time, the amount of available infor-
mation about us is increasing. By 1990, some five million
households will be hooked up to interactive cable television sys-
tems.5 These systems allow homeowners to conduct a range of ac-
tivities from their homes using only their personal computers and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
B.A., West Chester University (1974); J.D., Washington & Lee University (1978).
1. Landever, Electronic Surveillance, Computers, and the Fourth Amendment - The
New Telecommunications Environment Calls for Reexamination of Doctrine,, 15 U. TOL. L.
REV. 597, 598 (1984); Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment:
Knotts, Karo and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277, 281-84 (1984-
85) (Discussion of the uses of electronic tracking devices); See generally S. MANWARING-
WHITE, THE POLICING REVOLUTION: POLICE TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY IN BRITAIN
(1983).
2. Landever, supra note 1, at 598; Note, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion in
the Computer Age, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 831 (1984).
3. Halls, Raiding the Data Banks: A Developing Problem for Technologists and Law-
yers, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 245, 246 (1978); D. BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE at 11
(1983) ("Computers have allowed far more organizations to have far more access to far more
people at far less cost than ever was possible in the age of the manual file and the wizened
file clerk. [Moreover] much of this information would not have been collected at all, but
instead would have been stashed away in our homes.")
4. Soma & Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect of Com-
puters on Privacy, 60 DEN. L.J. 449 (1982-83).
5. Note, Interactive Cable Television: Privacy Legislation, 19 GONz. L. REV. 709 (1983-
84).
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telephones.6 Access to this information "will make society a trans-
parent world in which our homes, finances, and associations will be
bared to a wide range of observers."7
Current fourth amendment law allows the government un-
restricted access to this information because all of it was "volunta-
rily exposed" to third parties and, therefore government acquisi-
tion of it is not a fourth amendment search or seizure. Even the
development of more exotic detection methods may not be
searches covered by the amendment.9 The Framers of the fourth
amendment "could not anticipate the invention of telephones,
computers, data banks, or any of the electronic miracles of poten-
tial mischief surrounding us." 10 Concerned with searches for sub-
versive literature and untaxed goods the Framers adopted a system
based on procedural restraints. In a slower age, these procedural
restrictions worked to limit the exercise of arbitrary governmental
power. In an age where reams of private information can be re-
trieved in minutes, it seems Canute-like to invoke the fourth
amendment to halt governmental invasions of privacy.11 The tech-
nology may be advancing so rapidly that any limitations may be
political rather than constitutional. 2 Thus, one is tempted to ask:
6. These services include: home banking, instant voting, storage of personal informa-
tion, home shopping, instant response study courses, automatic regulation of utility use,
1,000 specialized data bases and emergency home monitoring. Id. at 710.
7. Soma & Wehmhoefer, supra note 4, at 449; See Note, supra note 5, at 710 ("Cable
company computers receive information on when, and if, you pay your bills, your bank ac-
count transactions, political and religious views, identity of housemates, consumers
purchases, programs watched and information requested.").
8. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also, Selvin, As Interactive Cable
Enters, Does Privacy Go Out the Window, 4 J. CoM. ENTERTAINMENT L.J., 781, 791-92
(1982). Infra see notes 32-39. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
9. See generally, Ulemen, 1991: A Fourth Amendment Odyssey, 70 A.B.A.J. 86 (1984).
Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
10. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental
Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1490 (1979).
11. Cf. Schwartz, Chief Justice Warren and 1984, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 975, 985 (1984)
(Suggests that former Chief Justice Warren may have been "Canute-like in interposing the
Bill of Rights" in the face of the ever increasing ability of government to violate individual
rights.).
12. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 558 (1978); R. MORGAN, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE at 12
(1980). See generally, Soma & Wehmoefer, supra note 4, at 482, where the authors call for
an international convention on privacy; Hoff, Two-way cable television and Informational
Privacy, 6 J. COMM. ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 797 (1984) (where the author proposes a model act
for the protection of interactive cable users' privacy); and O'Brien, The Detection and Re-
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is the fourth amendment obsolete?
The short answer to this question is no. The fourth amend-
ment is not obsolete because the core values it seeks to protect are
still important to a free society. 3 It is not "necessarily technology
that impacts society for good or bad, but its uses, which are, in
turn, shaped by the values of the society and by the historical con-
text in which the technology is used." 4 The current technological
changes require us to re-assert the values which prompted the
Framers to draft the fourth amendment. 15 These values have be-
come more and not less important. 6
Instead of asking if the fourth amendment is obsolete the bet-
ter question, and the one this article addresses, is how to restate
fourth amendment values to adequately protect individuals from
the danger of sophisticated and advancing surveillance and detec-
tion technology.'7
covery of Contraband Nuclear Material, 15 AKRON L. REV. 57 (1981) (where the author
suggests that current Fourth Amendment doctrine would not stop massive invasions of pri-
vacy in search of stolen nuclear material). See also, Kirby, Access to Information and Pri-
vacy: The Ten Information Commandments, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 745, 751 (1987).
13. Clark, Historical Antecedents of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 2 U. DArON
L. REV. 157, 198 (1977) ("The Constitution is, among other things a statement of enduring
values. While the challenge to those values may change over time, the values remain con-
stant ... while the problem in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries might have been
the invasion of the home by means of general warrants, history demonstrates the value at
stake there was the same as that endangered by the technology of the space age: privacy.")
See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Fourth
Amendment is not an outworn bit of eighteenth century romantic rationalism but an indis-
pensable need for a democratic society.)
14. Weingarten, Information Technology and Privacy Trends in Products and Ser-
vices, in Invited Papers on Privacy: Law, Ethics, and Technology (National Symposium on
Personal Privacy and Information Technology) 15 (1982).
15. Bacigal, supra note 12, at 558.
16. Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 1523. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
455 (1971).
17. This article will not discuss the related civil problems created by this burgeoning
technology. The literature in this area is rich and expansive. The classic works include Wes-
tin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1003 (1966) A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), and A. MILLER, ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS AND DOSSIERS (1971). See generally R. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COM-
PUTER TECHNOLOGY (1985); BENDER, PRIVACY, IN OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS: THE ACLU RE-
PORT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY, 243-46, 250-51 (W. Dorsen, Ed. 1984); Halls, supra note 3.
Because this article deals only with constitutional issues, it will not address the Federal
wiretap law, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2520 (1984) commonly known as Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Title III proscribes wire tapping or bugging unless
certain procedural safeguards are met, 18 U.S.C. 2516(1) (Attorney General must authorize
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I
At one time, the Supreme Court interpreted the search and
seizure clause of the fourth amendment to have independent sig-
nificance. Warrantless searches were judged by the standard of
reasonableness found in the first clause."8 In recent years, the
application for an order), and unless a prior judicial approval is obtained. (Judge of court of
competent jurisdiction can issue order authorizing the procedure with limited scope and
duration.) 18 U.S.C. 2518. Violations of Title III can result in criminal penalties, 18 U.S.C.
2511(1) (willful violations punishable by $10,000 fine, five years in prison, or both). See, e.g.,
United States v. Ross, 713 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Goldsmith, 483 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1973); civil liability, 18 U.S.C. 2520 (authorizes recovery of actual damages or a
civil penalty, punitive damages, and costs and fees); or suppression of the evidence in a
criminal proceeding. 18 U.S.C. 2518(10)(a) and (b). Although the Supreme Court has not yet
considered the constitutionality of Title III, every court save one to consider the question
has upheld the Act against constitutional challenges. See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE 33 n.116-17 (1977) for a collection of cases. Finally even though Title II was
designed to bring uniformity to this area of the law, states may adopt their own laws. 18
U.S.C. 2516(2). It is conceded, however, the state laws may be more protective of individual
rights but not less protective than Title III. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 2112, 2187.
Twenty-seven states responded by enacting their own legislation. C. FISHMAN, WIRETAP-
PING AND EAVESDROPPING 6 n.14 (1978) for a collection of jurisdictions. This is not to say that
Title III has solved all of the problems surrounding wiretaps. The vast majority of wiretaps
are conducted without following the statutory procedures because of the consent of one of
the parties. Moreover, the act does not apply to either video surveillance or to the intercep-
tion of computer data transmissions. U.S. v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1985) cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1087 (1985) (Television surveillance of the interior of a private building is not
per se unconstitutional, nor does Title III forbid it); United States v. Serdlitz, 589 F.2d 152
(4th Cir. 1978) cert. denied 441 U.S. 922 (1979) (Interception of computer data transmission
did not violate Title III.) See also, Hoff, Two-way Cable Television and Informational Pri-
vacy, 6 CoMM/ENT J.CoM. ENTERTAINMENT L. 797, 813 (1983) and Note, United States v.
Torres: The Need for Statutory Regulation of Video Surveillance, 12 J. LEGIs. 264, 269.
Finally, significant technological developments since the passage of Title III have made
parts of it obsolete. Fein, Regulating the Interception and Disclosure of Wire, Radio, and
Oral Communications: A Case Study of Federal Statutory Antiquation, 22, HARV. J. OF
LEGis. 47 (1985). Cordless telephones provide the best example of this development. Cor-
dless phones are not covered by Title III because they use radio frequencies accessible to
the public. Fein, 22 HARV.J. OF LEGIS. 47, 64. Moreover, courts have held that users have no
expectation of privacy in their conservations on cordless phones. State v. DeLaurier, 488
A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985); State v. Roudybush, 235 Kan. 834, 686 P.2d 100 (1984); State v. How-
ard, 235 Kan. 236, 679 P.2d 197 (1984). See Comment, Distinguishing Between Radio-Tele-
phone and Wire Communications: The Kansas Approach to Cordless Telephone Conversa-
tions, 24 WASHBURN L.J.. 175 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Harris v. United States 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Warrantless search of arres-
tee's home upheld because not unreasonable under the circumstances); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (Test for reasonableness is flexible and depends on
facts and circumstances of each case). The court was not entirely consistent in this empha-
sis, however, See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) and Weeks v. United States,
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Court has eschewed this standard 9 for a more mechanical focus:
warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable unless justified by
one of several exceptions.20 Of course, a search conducted pursuant
to a warrant must meet the requirements of the second clause of
the amendment: probable cause,21 particularity,2 2 and a neutral,
232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court explicitly repudi-
ated Rabinowitz and Harris in Chimel v. California, 359 U.S. 752 (1969). The seeds of this
rule were planted even as Harris was being decided. Compare Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, (1948) (" When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent. . . there are exceptional circumstances in which, balancing the need for effective law
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant to
search may be dispensed with") and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (The fair implication of the Constitution is that no search of premises, as
such, is reasonable except the cause for it be approved and the limits of it fixed and the
scope of it particularly defined by a disinterested magistrate.).
20. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). Although the Court has spoken of a few, well-defined and jealously guarded
exceptions, rhetoric does not match reality. There are at least seven exceptions to the war-
rant requirement: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches incident to arrest);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 757 (1966) (exigent circumstances); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (station-house inventories); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.s. 730 (1983)
(plain view); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (protective "frisk"). See Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions,
Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 198 (1977).
21. The police have probable cause when: "[T]he facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to
warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was commit-
ting an offense" or that particular items connected and criminal activity are located in a
particular place. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Although the requirement of probable
cause applies to all warrants, some administrative warrants are governed by a special proba-
ble cause standard. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Probable cause to issue
warrants for area searches for housing code compliance exists "if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling." Camara, 387 U.S. at 538. Warrants must be issued by a "neutral and
detached magistrate." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). Compare Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Attorney General of State not neutral and detached)
and Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (Magistrate who accompanied police
in raid on adult bookstore to review obscenity of items seized no longer detached). A magis-
trate need not be a lawyer or a judge so long as he/she is neutral and detached and is
capable of determining probable cause. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972).
Any warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Probable cause is a non-technical,
common-sense concept. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Reviewing courts must defer
to a magistrate's determination of probable cause if a "substantial basis" supports it. Mas-
sachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984).
22. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967) (Wiretap statute that allowed issuance of warrant on reasonable ground to believe
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detached magistrate.23 If a warrantless search has not fallen within
one of the exceptions or if the warrant has not complied with the
requirements of the amendment, the evidence obtained as a result
of the search must be suppressed.2' This emphasis on the warrant
clause has some, but not unanimous, historical support.
2 5
In any view of the fourth amendment the threshold definition
of a "search" or "seizure" becomes important. If police activity is
not a search or seizure then neither the reasonableness clause nor
the warrant clause applies.2 6 The police are free to pursue the par-
ticular investigative activity so long as it does not violate another
constitutional provision.27
that evidence of a crime may be obtained violated Fourth Amendment rule of particular-
lity); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (Warrant to seize allegedly obscene
magazines must be particularized and may not issue on officer's conclusory assertion).
23. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See supra note 21.
24. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984) (Suppression is not a proper remedy if police rely in objective good faith on a search
warrant that may not meet the required standards for probable cause). The exclusionary
rule is not applicable in Grand Jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), or in some civil tax proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), or in
civil deportation hearings, INS v. Lopez-Mendoz, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) or when police act in
objectively reasonable reliance on statute authorizing warantless administrative search, Illi-
nois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
25. See infra, text accompanying notes 183-189. See Stelzner, The Fourth Amend-
ment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M. L. REV, 33 (1979-80) (Tension
between two clauses historically part of fundamental Fourth Amendment debate).
26. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
See generally, Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable us. The Fourth Amendment
Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What?", 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 75. See also Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (Probable Cause not necessary when police not con-
ducting a search); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Particularity not required); Illi-
nois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (Warrant not needed).
27. In one early case the Supreme Court suggested that the protections of the fourth
and fifth amendments ran together. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (court noted
the "intimate relation" of the two amendments). This position has been eroded steadily over
the years until its implicit reversal in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); See Note,
The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977).
Given the testimonial requirement for fifth amendment protection, Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), and the requirement of formal judicial proceedings to invoke the sixth
amendment, Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the only other constitutional
provision which might restrain the police in the investigative stage of a criminal case is the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)
("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the
core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.") The violation must be inimical
to a scheme of "Ordered Liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Such an
approach only protects against extremely abusive practices. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (police "shocked the conscience" of the court when they illegally entered defend-
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The modern standard for determining whether or not police
activity is a search comes from Katz v. United States.28 Rejecting
the parties' formulation of the issues, Justice Stewart declared:
[T]he fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of fourth amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to pre-
serve as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected. 9
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion which over time has
become the accepted interpretation of Katz. Harlan wrote that the
proper inquiry was two-fold. First, did a person exhibit an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, will society recog-
nize this expectation as reasonable.3 0 In practice, these two prongs
have merged into a single definition: "[a] search occurs when an
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasona-
ble" is infringed.3"
Although Katz was hailed as a great achievement, it has failed
to live up to its potential.32 Using the Katz standard, the Supreme
Court has held that the word "search" did not include bugged in-
formers,3" voice and handwriting exemplars,34 or acquisition of per-
ant's home, tried to pry open his mouth, and then forced a doctor to pump his stomach).
Presumably, exclusion is the appropriate remedy for evidence obtained in this manner.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But cl. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(exclusion appropriate when it will deter police conduct). Once investigative conduct falls
outside of the fourth amendment's scope the conduct is not bound for all practical purposes
by any constitutional restrictions.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29. Id. at 351-52.
30. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
32. Compare Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of The Fourth Amendment,
1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133 (fourth amendment now released from the moorings of precedent)
and Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974)
(Katz meant to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment) with Allen, The Judicial
Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518
(The Supreme Court failed to pursue the implications of its insight).
33. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Justice Black provided the fifth vote
for the majority by concurring in the result. White 401 U.S. at 754. Black took an even more
restrictive position than the majority. The plurality opinion is cited as though it were a
majority decision. Compare the opinions of Justices White and O'Connor (concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) in which
both justices discuss the meaning of the White case.
34. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplars); United States v.
Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplars). Although fingerprinting may not be a
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sonal financial records from a band 5 or an accountant.36 Because
in one way or another the defendants in the foregoing cases volun-
tarily revealed information to someone else, the court found that
society would no longer recognize their expectation of privacy as
reasonable.
The most extreme form of this voluntary disclosure rule came
in Smith v. Maryland7 where the Court held that installation of a
pen register was not a search because the telephone user had no
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed. Because the caller
would have lost his expectation of privacy if he had revealed his
numbers to a human operator, he lost his expectation when his
numbers were conveyed to electronic switching equipment. The
Court reasoned:
When [the petitioner] used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that in-
formation to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so do-
ing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police
the numbers he/she dialed. The switching equipment that processed
those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in
an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner
concedes that if he had placed his calls through an operator, he could
claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold
that a different constitutional result is required because the telephone
company has decided to automate . . .
Smith does violence to the plain meaning of the fourth
amendment and its intent. In Smith, the police were searching for
search, transportation to and detention at the police station for the purpose of finger print-
ing requires either consent or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811
(1985).
35. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (Depositor had no expectation of pri-
vacy in contents or original checks and deposit slips). Miller generated a great deal of aca-
demic criticism. See e.g., W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, § 27 at 411-17 where Miller is called "dead wrong" and its effect termed "per-
nicious." and Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Pri-
vacy", 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1313 (1981). In response to Miller Congress passed the Right
to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422 (Supp. 1979), which requires that a cus-
tomer receive notice and an opportunity to respond before any bank records are turned over
to the government. See Rasor, Controlling Government Access to Personal Financial
Records, 25 WASHBURN L. J. 417 (1986) For a survey of the law after Miller.
36. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (No expectation of privacy in financial
records turned over to an accountant for preparation of tax return).
37. 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
38. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
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something-the numbers Smith dialed. More important, however,
is the way Smith neuters the fourth amendment's application to
modern technology. It is unrealistic to expect someone in the twen-
tieth century to forego the use of the telephone." Not only does
the telephone allow us to communicate to others but also, when
used in conjunction with a computer, it can allow us to conduct
almost all our business from home."'
These and other recent cases reveal the narrowness of the
Katz standard.41 To be sure, some of the difficulty is inherent in
the standard. The standard has been called vague, shifting, and
illusory."2 One commentator characterized Katz as a "lawless rul-
ing-a decision to do without a standard and a decision to tie the
constitutional right to privacy to changing cultural expectations of
privacy."4 " Another commentator charged that a broad reading of
Katz, whereby warrants would be required for every investigation,
39. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J. dissenting); LaFave Treatise, supra note 35,
at 412; See also, Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullifi-
cation of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH U.L. REV. 557, 573 (1980).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7. See also Selvin, supra note 8. (The small
plastic keyboard wired to a central computer will enable the user to view cable television
programs, take college courses, participate in community action meetings and respond to
opinion polls, talk shows and debates. In addition, subscribers will be able to purchase prod-
ucts seen on television by ordering them through their interactive cable system and charging
them to their banking or credit accounts. In the future, the system may interact with de-
partment stores, service operations, banks, police and fire departments, schools, civic centers
and others elements within society.) Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identifica-
tion Systems, Computer Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 991
(1984). (Interactive cable television systems are capable of gathering vast amounts of per-
sonal data, not only on consumer's viewing habits, but also on their buying and banking
habits, as more services are added. Cable companies, for example, will soon offer burglar
alarm systems which will tell the company when a consumer is at home).
41. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring a beeper at-
tached to a car was not a Fourth Amendment search) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984) (monitoring a beeper inside a package while it was inside a house was a fourth
amendment search). See LaFave, Fourth Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Im-
perceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing Askew), 74 J. CraM. L. &
CRIMOLOGY 1171, 1174-78 (1983) for a discussion critical of Knotts. See generally, Comment,
Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461 (1977);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners have no legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (No expectation of privacy in an open
field). New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986). (No reasonable expectation of privacy in
Vehicle Identification Number).
42. The Supreme Court 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 202 (1980).
43. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
1, 6, n.12 (1977).
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would trivialize the warrant process." Moreover, saying the fourth
amendment protects privacy begs the question.45 The inquiry
should be directed toward ascertaining "what interests . .. are
protected by the prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizures."46 In addition, the Burger Court has declined the invita-
tion of Katz to explicate the central concepts of the fourth amend-
ment.47 Instead the Court has fashioned rules which, if they do not
limit Katz to its facts, greatly restrict its usefulness. 48 Aside from
these doctrinal problems, however, lies a more fundamental con-
cern. Katz in whatever doctrinal guise it takes has been leap-frog-
ged by advancements in surveillance technology. In a related con-
text, Schwartz noted that "the technical changes wrought by
scientific progress have outstripped the law and legal commentary.
The Warren Court's protective jurisprudence may become com-
pletely outmoded by the seven-league strides being made in long-
distance eavesdropping."'4
9
This problem is not new. In Olmstead v. United States,50 the
Supreme Court held that wire-tapping was not a search or a
seizure because there was no entry upon the defendant's prop-
erty.51 The Court noted that:
The language of the amendment can not be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires reaching to the whole world . . .[olne who in-
stalls in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends
to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his
house and messages while passing over them are not within the protec-
44. Kitch, supra note 32, at 134.
45. Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meanings of "Searches" in
the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CaM. L. & CRIMOLOGY 319 (1984).
46. Id. See also Burkhoff, When is a Search not a "Search'? Fourth Amendment
DoubleThink, 15 U. TOL. L. REV.. 515, 530, (1984); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 (1974). Cf. Bacigal, Some Observations and Propos-
als on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 534 (1978) (Defin-
ing privacy inherently difficult because privacy is many discrete rights, some of which are
related while others are unrelated or inconsistent).
47. Allen, supra note 32, at 133.
48. Compare U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (electronic participant monitoring not
a Fourth Amendment search) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (electronic
monitoring of telephone call a Fourth Amendment Search.) See United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
49. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 987.
50. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
51. 277 U.S. at 466.
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tion of the fourth amendment.2
Justice Brandeis' dissent is an extended essay on the relation-
ship of technology and privacy. Brandeis argued that constitu-
tional clauses guaranteeing individual rights should adapt to a
changing world. He said:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth . . . Under any other rule a con-
stitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient
in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and
be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights
declared in words might be lost in reality. 3
The Framers designed the fourth and fifth amendments to
protect citizens from forcible physical intrusions because that was
the only contemporary means of acquiring information but science
has now made it possible "to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet" without recourse to force, violence, or
physical entry.5 4 Brandeis went on in remarkably prophetic words:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espi-
onage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the government, without removing papers from se-
cret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be ena-
bled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."6
After recalling colonial era precedent, Brandeis rhetorically asked:
"Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?""6
Brandeis summoned the ghost of Boyd v. United States57 to
help define the appropriate constitutional standard. According to
Boyd the fourth and fifth amendments work together to protect a
citizen's "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property.15 8 It is not the means by which information
52. 277 U.S. at 465-66.
53. 277 U.S. at 472-73 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
54. 277 U.S. at 473.
55. 277 U.S. at 474.
56. 277 U.S. at 474.
57. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
58. 116 U.S. at 630.
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is obtained that is to be condemned. 59 Rather, it is the end for
which the information is sought and the consequent indignity to
the person that is to be condemned.60 To Brandeis, the fourth
amendment was one piece of the "right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 61 Whenever the government infringed on that right, it vio-
lated the fourth amendment.2
Brandeis recognized that sophisticated technology could de-
vour individual rights. Although wire-tapping was the immediate
problem, Brandeis correctly predicted further dangerous techno-
logical development." His solution required an inquiry into the
values behind the fourth amendment. It required a court to inter-
pose an absolute value-individual security-against governmental
action. At the time, however, this jurispruidential style was being
replaced by legal realism. Realism was typified by a moral relativ-
ism which demanded that legal principles be justified by the de-
gree to which they contributed to the greater social good.', Realists
had no absolute values for judges to enforce. Rather, judges were
59. 116 U.S. at 630.
60.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that consti-
tutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it is the invasion of
this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of [Entick v. Car-
rington]. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances
of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
mony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other. 116 U.S. at 630.
In spite of Brandeis' declaration that Boyd will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives
in the United States, its holding has not fared well over the years. The Court steadily
eroded Boyd's theory of the intimate relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments
until it was implicitly overruled in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Boyd's
holding that the compulsory production of business records violated the fifth amendment
went out with a whimper in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). See also Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See generally Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v.
United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, (1977).
61. 277 U.S. at 478.
62. Id.
63. See e.g., Landever, supra note 1; Selvin, supra note 8; Shattuck, supra note 40;
Soma & Wehmhoefer, supra note 4.
64. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 40-41 (1963) (Society's interests may
outweigh justice to the individual); See generally, B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921).
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to use instrumentalism and balancing to decide cases.65 Indeed,
Brandeis, concluded his Olmstead opinion with a bit of instrumen-
talism. After his vigorous plea in defense of individual security,
Brandeis argued that suppression of the evidence would "teach the
whole people."6 Because government is the omnipresent teacher,
it must lead by example. If government can break the law in pur-
suit of criminals, then citizens may not respect the law either and
break it to pursue their own needs. 7
The goal of the realists was to prevent courts from obstructing
social progress through the imposition of so-called absolute values.
Lochner v. New York"8 had come to symbolize all that was wrong
with the old jurisprudence. In many ways, the problems in Lochner
came about because of the pressure modern conditions placed on
the formal legal concepts.6 ' Lochner and its progeny were outstrip-
65. O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law, in Collected Legal Papers 186 (1920) ("A body of
law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is referred articulately
and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are
stated or are ready to be stated in words.").
66. 277 U.S. at 485.
67.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In the gov-
ernment of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to ob-
serve the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breakers, it breeds contempt for
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernicious doctrine, this Court should resolutely set its face. 277 U.S. at 485.
68. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, Hand, Due Process and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HAR. L.
REV. 495 (1908). See generally, Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law,
(1942). At times, the modern Court has disparaged the Lochner era. Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (Lochner repudiated); Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (Court will not sit as a super legislature). Lochner often
is used in a pejorative sense. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Court's opinion like majority's in Lochner). But cf. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (Lochner more defensible than Roe]).
69. The precise issue in Lochner was whether or not a state maximum hours law vio-
lated a worker's liberty of contract. 198 U.S. at 53. See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (Oregon law that limited the number of hours women could work constitutional);
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1980) (Federal Law which made it illegal to fire em-
ployee solely because of union membership was unconstitutional). See Brandeis, The Living
Law, 11 ILL. L. REV. 461, 464 (1916) ("Courts continued to ignore newly arisen social
needs."); A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 59-60 (1968).
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ped by and forced to accommodate social and scientific advance-
ment.70 The essence of the dispute between Brandeis and the ma-
jority in Olmstead concerned which absolute value to
choose-private property or individual security. The realists re-
belled against this formalism in favor of their more flexible
jurisprudence.7
By all accounts, the realists' victory has been overwhelming.72
Especially in economic areas, Courts now employ the instrumental
and balancing methods. 73 A similar development occurred within
the fourth amendment. Olmstead proved "hopelessly simplistic in
coping with the real world of developing technology." '74 Cases sub-
sequent to Olmstead continued to narrow its rule until, in Katz,
Justice Stewart could declare that Olmstead had been substan-
tially undermined. 7' The Katz rule represented a victory for the
[Tihe Court considered the power of the individual worker to be equal to the
power of the employer-even though that employer was a collectivity, a corpora-
tion, and a person in law only by application of a transparent legal fiction-an
assumption that is difficult to explain except on grounds of willful blindness, or,
perhaps, of a complete lack of knowledge of the facts of industrial life. The entire
Court at that time did not recognize that the collective nature of economic en-
deavor had created an entirely new social milieu in which ancient doctrines of
individuals and of freedom had to operate. They failed to see that freedom could
be limited by centers of economic power-the corporation-as well as by
government.
70. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the New Technological
Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893 (1984) (Major shifts in Constitutional doctrine occurred after
the Industrial Revolution).
71. Mott & Mott, Property and Personal Privacy: Interrelationship, Abandonment
and Confusion in the Path of Judicial Review, 18 J. MAR. L. REV. 847, 854 (1985) (Legal
Realism shifted from metaphysics to social engineering and the Boyd premise was a casualty
as the Court admitted an ever expanding category of instrumentality).
72. See, e.g., Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and The Post-Realist Constitution, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 521 (1976); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34; See generally, E. Corwin, Lib-
erty Against Government (1948).
73. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (Due process satisfied if law bears a
reasonable relation to a legitimate purpose); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (minimum scrutiny of means and
ends in due process and equal protection cases); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970) (Court outlines a test for dormant Commerce Clause cases that includes both a
means and end analysis and a balancing test); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(Congress has broad power to legislate if legislation is means to a commerce power end).
74. Hufstedler, supra note 10, at 1495.
75. 389 U.S. at 359. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Spike-mike
which penetrated wall a Fourth Amendment Search).
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realists. The Court did not announce an absolute right to privacy
from governmental eavesdropping. Rather, the Court made inva-
sion of privacy contingent upon proper justification and proper
procedures."
The relativization of fourth amendment privacy has led to the
shrinking compass of the fourth amendment." Privacy inevitably
loses when it is balanced against the needs of law enforcement.
The balance is skewed against the law-breakers because it is more
expedient to catch law-breakers than to adhere to technical rules.7 8
The fourth amendment now wanders from case to case ensuring
that the guilty are convicted but without enforcing its normative
content. 9
The technological changes wrought by the realists have been
successful in economic and social policy precisely because instru-
mentalism and moral relativism were well suited to those ques-
tions. It has failed in the fourth amendment because the "core val-
ues" of the amendment cannot be quantified and therefore cannot
be balanced. Ironically, the Court now has returned to a kind of
formalism in some cases which emphasizes property concepts.80
76. "The duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investiga-
tion, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed and clearly appraised of
the precise situation it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropri-
ate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took
place." See Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REV. 945, 970 (1977).
77. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984). See Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 1, 6, 12 (1983).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Framers knew] that the task of com-
bating crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such critical and pressing
concern that we may be lured by the temptations of expediency into forsaking our commit-
ment to protecting individual liberty and privacy."); Burkoff, When is a Search Not a
"Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 515, 557 (1984) (Burger
Court acts like over zealous police department).
79. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (no legitimate expectation of
privacy in contraband.) and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Cost of freeing the
guilty may outweigh benefits of exclusion of illegally seized evidence). But cf., Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983)
(No Fourth Amendment right to secrete evidence and a correlative right of government to
search for it).
80. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) no search because informa-
tion gathered in public available to all) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
(Monitoring a beeper after it crosses threshold of house is a search because information not
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This new formalism does not adequately take into account the de-
mands of modern life and the features of modern technology.
Technology is allowed to erode fourth amendment protection, drop
by drop."1
Commentators have noted the problem current fourth amend-
ment doctrine poses. Professor Landever noted that although
"[w]e have not yet entered George Orwell's 1984; . . . we have
more than enough technology to meet Big Brother's needs."82 He
would require a warrant for almost every fourth amendment activ-
ity except "where an emergency or other unusual circumstance
demonstrate that judicial involvement is not appropriate. 8 3 For
example, he would require a warrant in participant monitoring
cases because a free society, not a citizen, should assume the risks
involved in the administration of the fourth amendment.
8 4
Landever goes too far. Requiring a warrant for all fourth
amendment activity is not supported by the text, history, or policy
of the fourth amendment.8 5 It would elevate form over substance
and would trivialize rather than enhance the warrant process.
8
1
Landever's cure would be as bad as the current fourth amend-
ment disease. Now the courts must declare that reasonable police
activity is not a search to salvage it from the per se unreasonable
rule. Courts under Landever's system would be tempted to find
"an emergency or other unusual situation" to salvage warrantless
searches.
Finally, Landever's approach is divorced from the more com-
available to public.) See also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980). See Schlesinger and Wilson, Property, Privacy and Deterrence: The
Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 225 (1980) for scholarly com-
mentary arguing in favor of a property centered analysis; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term 94
HARV. L. REV. 77 (1980); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test,
76 MicH. L. REV. 154 (1977). See Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1298, 1301 (1981) for the story of the shift
from property to privacy.
81. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125, (1984), (Brennan, J. dissenting);
Landever, supra note 1, at 598; Lafave Treatise, supra note 35, at § 2.2.
82. Landever, supra note 1, at 597-98.
83. Id. at 600.
84. Id. at 626.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 128-196.
86. Kitch supra note 32, at 152.
[Vol. 22:483
FOURTH AMENDMENT OBSOLETE?
mon fourth amendment areas. The connection is not clear and,
thus, we run the risk of creating an ever more complex body of
doctrine with warrants required for the high-tech branch of the
fourth amendment but not necessarily for the low-tech branch."
Professor Arnold Loewy's proposed fourth amendment theory
explicitly focuses on the reasonableness clause.8 Loewy's thesis is
that the primary purpose of the amendment is to protect the inno-
cent.89 Reasonableness should be defined by balancing the likeli-
hood of the searchee's innocence, the harm done to him if inno-
cent, and the gain in crime detection if he is guilty." The
protections of the fourth amendment may be invoked by the guilty
only when necessary to protect the innocent. 1
Loewy's theory has the virtue of rationalizing the two clauses
of the amendment.2 Moreover, it avoids the problem with the in-
flexibility associated with theories which require warrants. He
posits a utopian society in which the police are equipped with "an
evidence-detecting divining rod."9 3 This rod would find evidence of
a crime and nothing more. 4 In Loewy's utopia all the evidence of
crime would be found but no innocent persons would be
searched.95 Loewy would approve of the evidence detection rod as
a reasonable search.
96
Loewy's approach is the opposite of Landever's. Under a rigid
doctrinal and procedural system courts will be tempted to create
fine distinctions in favor of the police. 7 Courts under Loewy need
87. Cf. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, (1985)
(Fourth Amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication
and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973) (Fourth
Amendment cases are a "mess").
88. Loewy, Protecting Citizens from Cops and Crooks, 62 N.C. L. REV. 329, 355 (1984).
89. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MIcH.
L. REV. 1229 (1983).
90. Loewy, supra note 88, at 356.
91. Loewy, supra note 89, at 1248. Loewy argues that United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745 (1971) reh. denied 402 U.S. 990 and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) are wrong
because both cases allow the police to substantially intrude upon innocent activity. Loewy,
supra note 89, at 1225-56.
92. Loewy, supra note 89, at 1239.




97. Cf. Lafave Treatise, supra note 35. (All or nothing Katz test tempts courts to de-
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not be tempted at all. They will find that the police activity does
not threaten innocent conduct. Indeed, the current fourth amend-
ment cases do just that."
We need a theory of the fourth amendment that accurately
states its core values and keeps pace with advancing technology in
its application. Fourth amendment security is neither absolute nor
relative. The text of the fourth amendment recognizes this simple
proposition. It does not prohibit all searches but only unreasonable
ones. The amendment itself strikes the balance between individual
security and social need. Therefore, the focus in any theory of the
fourth amendment should be on the reasonableness clause.
The Supreme Court has been moving in this direction. In sev-
eral recent cases the Court has explicitly adopted a balancing test
to ascertain the reasonableness of police activity.9 9 In other cases,
the Court has invoked the conventional language but appeared to
rest its decision on the general reasonableness of the search.00
Professor Wasserstrom has vigorously criticized this trend.101
He argued that the Burger Court has used the "boundlessly ma-
nipulable process" of cost benefit analysis to limit the exclusionary
rule and substantive fourth amendment law.10 2 In particular, Was-
serstrom claimed that a case like Illinois v. Gates'0 3 "robs the
fourth amendment of virtually all operative significance" and
comes close to reducing the fourth amendment to a test of general
reasonableness. 1 4 Although he criticizes this test because it does
cide cases in favor of police).
98. Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (Dog sniff may not be a
search because only information about criminal conduct revealed) and United States v.
Montoya De Hernandez 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (Extended detention of suspected alimen-
tary canal smuggler justified, in part, "by the method [the defendant] chose to smuggle
drugs into this country.")
99. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (Constitutionality of school
search depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.); Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985) (Reasonableness of surgical removal of evidence from defendents body de-
termined by balancing individual interest against society's).
100. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (Chemical field test of sub-
stance not a Fourth Amendment search).
101. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRim. L.
REV. 257 (1984).
102. Id. at 262.
103. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
104. Wasserstrom, supra note 101, at 274.
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little to control police discretion his major objection to it is the
ease with which it can be manipulated by courts to reach any
result.'"5
Manipulability is not the sole province of general reasonable-
ness, however. The fourth amendment jurisprudence of the Burger
Court shows how even so-called bright line rules can be used to
reach predetermined results. The development of the Katz line of
cases from its initial promise to its current dead end shows how
the Burger Court used conventional legal analysis to restrict the
fourth amendment's scope. 06 Most commentators would agree
with Wasserstrom that the Katz formula is "little more than read-
ily manipulable cant . . . One can also point to the develop-
ments concerning automobiles, 108  stationhouse inventories,0 9
searches incident to arrest,1'0 and searches in the open fields"' to
show how the Burger Court used existing doctrine to achieve con-
servative results. No test can insulate the law from result-oriented
jurisprudence but a test focusing on the reasonableness clause at
least acknowledges what the Court may already be doing and al-
lows other justices, courts, and commentators to debate its
principles." 2
Other critics of a reasonableness standard claim that is would
provide the police with insufficient guidance. " ' The lack of guid-
ance objection can be refuted. Current fourth amendment law is a
mass of contradictory rules plagued with hairsplitting distinc-
105. Wasserstrom, supra note 101, at 271. Wasserstrom reserves his most severe criti-
cism for a test of general reasonableness based on a cost benefit analysis. Id. at 312-20. The
approach advocated in this article is not a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it resembles what
Wasserstrom calls "a series of fixed, but graduated, restraints on searches and seizures in
proportion to their intrusiveness and to the sanctity of the interests" invaded. Id. at 309.
Other commentators have advocated theories focused on the reasonableness clause. Loewy,
supra notes 88 & 89; Bradley; supra note 87.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 32-48.
107. Wasserstrom, supra note 101, at 271.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 239-249.
109. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (impounded vehicle); Colorado v.
Bertine, - U.S. - 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987) (bag inside impounded vehicle); Illinois v. Lafay-
ette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (shoulder bag of arrestee).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 233-236.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 202-204.
112. DiPippa, Searching for the Fourth Amendment, 7 U.A.L.R. L.J. 587, 642 (1984).
113. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PiTT. L. REV. 307, 324 (1982).
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tions. '1 4 If courts cannot reconcile the rules in the area it is unreal-
istic to expect the "cop on the beat" to do so.115 Moreover, catalogs
of artificial rules are difficult to apply. '16 A properly defined rea-
sonableness standard simply asks officers to apply common sense
to matters that police will naturally tend to consider. '17 It would
ask no more of officers than the tort law asks of the rest of us."1
8 If
the standard of reasonableness is defined functionally-that is, by
reference to what police officers actually do during a search and to
the actual effects of searches and seizures-police officers will be in
no worse shape than now, with our subtle doctrines, and courts will
find it harder to massage the facts to reach predetermined
results. '19
Professor Goldberger suggests that any new approach must
meet certain conditions.1 20 First, it "would have to identify care-
fully all of the interests protected" by the amendment. 12' Second it
would have to be objective, that is, external to arbitrary, ad hoc
limitation, either judicial or legislative. 2 2 Finally, it would have to
be flexible, that is, capable of responding to technological or other
developments in police techniques without losing its protective
function.'23
I propose a new theory of the fourth amendment that satisfies
Goldberger's criteria by focusing on the reasonableness clause.
Courts should do away with the threshold inquiry into the defini-
tion of a search. 24 Rather, courts should take a common-sense ap-
114. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)(O'Connor, J. concurring in part in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
115. Aslchuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pir. L. REV.
227, 234 (1984).
116. Id. at 231.
117. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1491
(1985).
118. Alschuler, supra note 115, at 233.
119. But see Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 375 (Fourth Amendment would resemble a
Rorschach test).
120. Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of "searches" in




124. To some extent the inquiry into the existence of a search is similar to the inquiry
into the existence of property or liberty interests in a procedural due process case. Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). My approach would more closely resemble that taken
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proach to the question and find any purposive investigative activ-
ity into a citizen's affairs a search.' 25 Although other commentators
have advanced theories based on a revitalization of the reasonable-
ness clause, 26 the theory advanced in this article would test the
validity of fourth amendment searches by a rule of reasonableness
measured by the degree to which the search resembles the kind of
activity the framers meant to proscribe when they drafted the
amendment. It is not enough, however, to ask if the framers would
have approved of the search in question. The question is impossi-
ble to answer because of today's vastly different social conditions
and the ever-more invasive technologies available to the police.
Rather, the amendment's core values should be ascertained by re-
sort to the historical materials but they should be defined func-
tionally. That is, they should be stated as behavioral imperatives
or prohibitions which can be applied to the conduct of the police in
a particular case.
The test would expressly focus on the scope and the manner of
the search. Courts would have to go beyond the current "conven-
tional interpretation ' '11 7 or facile cost-benefit analysis and look at
the way the police carried out the search itself. Finally, warrants
would be preferred so long as they did not authorize searches un-
reasonable in their scope or manner.
II
Defining the Framer's intent for any constitutional provision
is bound to be an elusive enterprise for the historical sources are
by courts in substantive due process cases where the Court seems to assume the existence of
a protected interest. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Monogahn, "Of Liberty
and Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
125. Other commentators have advocated a similar approach. Tomkovicz, Secrecy for
Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province,
36 HASTINGS L.J. 645-64 (1985) (Inherent in the notion of searching is an attempt to acquire,
or the acquisition of, information); Bacigal, supra note 12, at 562 (Search should encompass
any information-gathering activity by the state including careful inquiry, research, and sys-
tematic tracking.) Goldberger, supra note 120, at 324 (Fourth Amendment activity is any
governmental action impairing a person's interest in the privacy of physical presence, place,
communication, or possession); Note, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of
the Post-Katz Jurisprudence, WASH. L. REV. 191, 194 (1986)(Search should be defined by
whether or not government conduct violates a social norm of privacy).
126. Bradley, supra note 87; Loewy, supra note 88 and 89.
127. Wasserstrom, supra note 101.
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vague, scanty, and inconclusive.128 The fourth amendment's pedi-
gree is clearer. Scholars agree that the Framers directed the fourth
amendment against general warrants.
129
The Framers drafted the fourth amendment to guard against
the objectionable practices which they had recently experienced.'
Although the history of the search power goes back several hun-
dred years prior to the American Revolution, the most important
historical events happened closer to the Revolution.'
Sir Matthew Hale declared that "a general warrant to search
in all suspected places is not good."'3 2 Hale was concerned with the
legal authority to conduct a search. A valid warrant provided "con-
stables and other public officials" with an absolute defense to a
trespass action.' 3 Thus, only warrants issued for particular places
and upon probable cause were valid because "these warrants are
judicial acts and must be granted upon examination of the fact."'" 4
Hale objected to general warrants because they made the party
searching "to be in effect the judge."' 3 5 Hale's discussion of war-
rants is concerned with warrants for stolen goods because warrants
were not often used in other cases."' The Star Chamber issued the
first warrant for something other than stolen goods during the
reign of Queen Elizabeth."s7 The Star Chamber began to issue
search warrants in political cases while the Court of High Commis-
128. In a different context, Justice Jackson noted his surprise:
[alt the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what our
forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern con-
ditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams of Jo-
seph was called to upon to interpret for Pharaoh.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
See W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1953) for a unique approach to the
Framer's intent. See generally, P. BOBEITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9-24 (1982).
129. See e.g., Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47,
50 (1974).
130. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT, 20 (1966).
131. Id. at 20-27.
132. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN at 150 (1947).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 149.
136. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, Part One, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 284 (1969).
137. Id.
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sion began to issue general warrants."8" Eventually, General War-
rants became the rule in seditious libel actions. 39
Although the increasing use of general warrants generated
some opposition, it was not until the middle of the Eighteenth
Century that general warrants fell from grace. In the litigation that
followed the ransacking of John Wilkes' house, Chief Justice Pratt
said the general warrant in that case was "arbitrary power, violat-
ing Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the
kingdom."14
In the famous case of Entick v. Carrington, Pratt attacked the
general warrant.1 4 1 If general warrants were sustained "the secret
cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this Kingdom will be
thrown open to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever
the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a
person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious li-
bel. 1" 2 Star Chamber precedent to the contrary was "null".
1 43
Later Lord Chatham expressed the full scope of the growing dis-
pleasure against general warrants:
The poorest may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storm may enter, the rain may enter; but the King of England may




139. Id. at 285.
140. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 28. Wilkes published an offensive series of pam-
phlets attacking the government. Lord Halifax, Secretary of State, issued a general warrant
for the arrest of those responsible and the seizure of their papers. After the arrest of forty-
nine people, Halifax's messenger learned that Wilkes had authored one pamphlet in particu-
lar. The messenger arrested Wilkes over his protests and ransacked his house and papers.
Both the printers of the pamphlet and Wilkes successfully sued the messengers for false
imprisonment. A critical issue in the cases was the propriety of the warrants under which
the messengers acted. Id. See also, Stengel, supra note 136, at 286-87; I. BRANT, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ITS ORIGINS AND MEANING 189-93 (1965).
141. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765). By now, Pratt had been elevated to the
peerage as Lord Camden. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 29. Entick brought a suit for tress-
pass after a general search of his papers. Entick, like Wilkes, was involved with a publica-
tion critical of the government. Entick won a jury verdict of three hundred pounds which
Pratt, now Lord Camden, affirmed on appeal. Id.
142. HOWELL'S STATE TRIALS supra note 141, at 1063.
143. Lord Camden said such precedent was "null, and nothing but ignorance can ex-
cuse the judge that subscribed [to] it." Id. at 1071.
144. Stengel, supra note 136, at 288.
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These sources illustrate the dangers of general warrants. They
were subversive of liberty, notably the liberty to speak freely. They
were too broad: all subjects were threatened by them. They were
too intrusive: private, innocent information was disclosed in the
process of the search. On the other hand, although popular and
political sentiment was aroused against all general search warrants,
and Parliament abolished them in 1766, it never abolished general
arrest warrants.1
4 5
Although these judicial and parliamentary actions offered reli-
gious and political dissenters more freedom, "ordinary run-of-the-
mill criminal suspects" received little protection.' 6
Opposition to the American version of the general warrant
arose among some ordinary criminals of the day-smugglers. This
opposition combined with the libertarian notions from England
and eventually led to the adoption of the fourth amendment.
In America, the general warrant appeared as the writ of assis-
tance.1 47 These writs may have been worse than the general war-
rants issued in seditious libel cases because they were permanent
and vested the government with unlimited discretion. They were
permanent search warrants placed in the hands of customs offi-
cials; they might be used with unlimited discretion and were valid
for the duration of the life of the sovereign. 14 Their use aroused
much opposition in the colonies. For example, in 1772 the Boston
town meeting drew up "A List of Infringements and Violations of
Rights" which, among other things, colorfully declared that "our
houses and even our bed chambers are exposed to be ransacked,
our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered
by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even
as menial servants.
1 49
145. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 30; Lasson, The History and Development of the
Fourth Amendment 48-49 (1937).
146. Stengel, supra note 136, at 289.
147. Writs of Assistance were used to enforce the provisions of a number of navigation
and trade acts. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 30. These writs were issued by courts and
remained in effect for the life of the sovereign. T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 35, 36 (1969).
148. Landynski, supra note 130, at 31. Ironically, colonial governors began to issue
writs because of the opposition to the practice of warrantless searches by customs officers.
Lasson, supra note 145, at 55.
149. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 25 (1955).
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The most famous example, however is the challenge brought
by Boston merchants to the issuance of new writs.150 They retained
James Otis, Jr.-"the most able, manly and commanding Charac-
ter of his Age at the Bar.' 15' Although Otis lost the case, his argu-
ment greatly influenced the Framers.'52 Echoing Entick, Otis
claimed that the writs were "the worst instrument[s] of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamen-
tal principles of law, that was ever found in an English law-
book. '" He compared the writs unfavorably with a general war-
rant because both were "unlimited geographically and perpetual
temporally."'' 5' These writs were particularly oppressive because
they invaded "one of the most essential branches of English Lib-
erty. . . the freedom of one's house.' 55 Otis made other, less spec-
tacular arguments15 which the Court rejected after a delay of nine
months during which it sought the advice of English officials.
157
The Boston case built on the gathering momentum in the col-
onies against general search warrants. Most colonies had guaran-
tees against arbitrary infringement of the colonist's rights, but
150. The old writs were due to expire in 1761 because of the death of George II in
October 1760. TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 36. For a detailed history of all aspects of the case
see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1976).
151. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 34, citing JAMES ADAMS DIARY, VOL. II, at 275.
152. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 35, citing JAMES ADAMS DIARY, VOL. II, at 275.
153. Id. at 34 citing ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, VOL. II, at 523.
154. TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 37.
155.
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedom of one's
house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihi-
late this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they
please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants may
enter-may break locks, bars and everything in their way-and whether they
break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bar suspicion
without oath is sufficient . . . . Again these writs are NOT RETURNED. Writs in
their very nature are temporary things; when the purposes for which they are is-
sued are answered, they exist no more; but these monsters in law live forever, no
one can be called to account. Thus reason and the constitution are both against
this writ.
Id. citing 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 141-44 (Wroth & Zobel ed. 1965).
156. Otis argued that the statutes authorizing the Writs did not apply in the colonies,
and that even if they did, they did not provide authority for the Writs. LANDYNSKI, supra
note 130, at 34; Taylor, supra note 147, at 37.
157. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 35. The presiding judge sought advice from the
provincial agent, a former Crown prosecutor in Massachusetts, instead of Pratt who by then
was Attorney General. Lasson, supra note 145, at 62-63.
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none specifically prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures un-
til just before the Revolution. 58 Apparently responding to Otis'
rhetoric and the increasing distaste for British economic regula-
tions, Virginia became the first colony to move against oppressive
searches and seizures. In June 1776, Virginia enacted its Declara-
tion of Rights.15 9 Among other things it stated:
The general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be com-
manded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed,
or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not par-
ticularly described, and supported by evidence, and grievous and oppres-
sive, and ought not to be granted.160
The Virginia Declaration was widely disseminated throughout
the colonies and fixed the pattern of rights in their own subse-
quent declarations. 16' The Pennsylvania version expressly declared
the right of the "people . . .to hold themselves, their houses, pa-
pers, and possessions free from search and seizure" absent war-
rants issued upon "oaths or affirmations first made." ' 2 Delaware,
Maryland, and North Carolina all followed suit in 1776, patterning
their declarations after both Virginia's and Pennsylvania's.6 3 To
bring home the point, North Carolina added that general warrants
"are dangerous to Liberty.""6 " In 1777, Vermont adopted the Penn-
sylvania version verbatim.165 Massachusetts was the first state to
use the term "unreasonable search and seizure when it adopted its
Constitution in 1780, declaring:
every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause of foundation
of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the
order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places,
or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the per-
158. Stengel, supra note 136, at 293.
159. VIRGINIA'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS IN SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311-313 (R.
Perry & J. Cooper, eds. 1978) [Hereinafter cited as Sources.]
160. Id. at 312.
161. RUTLAND, supra note 149, at 44.
162. Sources, supra note 159, at 330.
163. Id. at 338, 346.
164. Id. at 355.
165. Id. at 362.
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sons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be
issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws. " 6
New Hampshire copied this provision in 1784 to complete the
pre-Constitutional development.
67
This textual history shows the immediate acceptance of the
prohibition on general warrants. So tenacious was this embrace
that in Connecticut, a state without a Bill of Rights, a court de-
clared a general warrant "clearly illegal."' 6 8 Robert Rutland ex-
plained that the revolutionary legislators did not bother "to ex-
amine the niceties of law" in framing their declarations of rights. 6 "
Instead, they sought to give full expression to a "whole catalog of
human rights which [they] reviewed . . . not as common law
rights, but as natural rights.' 170 Thus, by incorporating these ideas
into a legal system, "'the natural rights' became civil rights, and
these civil rights in turn received constitutional sanction."' 7 ' Even
though opposition to the writs of assistance arose in commercial
cases, the ready acceptance of the prohibition as natural law and
its inclusion in the Constitutions of eight states indicated that the
Colonists were as serious as the British about prohibiting these
kinds of searches.
The equation of general warrants with unreasonable searches
also helps explicate the meaning of the fourth amendment. The
Massachusetts Constitution made clear that the right of the people
in question is security from unreasonable searches and that war-
rants issued without oath or affirmation, or particularity were un-
reasonable. Even though colonial and early state authorities con-
ducted many warrantless searches, the trend was away from
arbitrariness.172 The opposition to the general warrants defined the
scope of this emerging natural right of security in one's person,
home, and possessions.
There is no recorded discussion of a search and seizure provi-
166. Id. at 376.
167. Id. at 383.
168. Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby, (Conn. 213-15 (1787)) cited in Stengel, supra note 136,
at 42.
169. RUTLAND, supra note 149, at 298.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 43.
172. Stengel, supra note 136, at 293.
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sion at the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, the discussion of a
Bill of Rights did not arise until late in the Convention's delibera-
tions and received short shrift from the tired delagates. The ab-
sence of a Bill of Rights and, in particular, a search and seizure
provision was a matter of some controversy in the debates over the
ratification of the Constitution."'3 In Pennsylvania, Richard Henry
Lee's "Federal Farmer" asserted that a freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures was one of certain fundamental rights which
should form the basis for the new government.1 74 In Virginia, Pat-
rick Henry railed against the lack of a search and seizure amend-
ment. Henry declared that the Virginia Constitution included the
famous Declaration of Rights which "guarded those indefeasible
rights which ought ever to be held sacred" but the base power of
the Federal Government would allow:
"[tihe officers of Congress [to] come upon you now ... [and] go into
your cellars and rooms, and search and ransack, and measure, everything
you eat, drink, and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper
bounds.1
75
Similar sentiments were expressed in New York, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.1
76
The Constitution was ratified without a Bill of Rights largely
on the strength of the Federalists' promise to include one as soon
as possible. 17 7 James Madison reminded his colleagues of this
promise several times during the early days of the First Congress.
He repeated the by-then well-known argument that a search and
173. Virginia and New York ratified the Constitution but with a call for a Bill of
Rights which would include a proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures. North
Carolina also proposed a Bill of Rights with a search provision but refused to ratify the
Constitution. Although both Pennsylvania and Maryland ratified the Constitution without a
call for any amendments there was strong sentiment in both states for a Bill of Rights with
search and seizure provisions. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 40-41. For a discussion of the
compromise whereby Federalists promised to prepare a Declaration of Rights during the
First Congress in exchange for Anti-Federalist votes in favor of ratification see RUTLAND,
supra note 149, at 159-89. 1) 15 (1787)) citing in Stengel, supra note 136, at See J. MAIN,
THE ANTIFEDERALISTS for a history of the Antifederalists campaign (1961).
174. RUTLAND, supra note 149, at 139 citing PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Force
Ed.) 290-91.
175. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States Part Two 4 URIcH. L. REV. 60, 70 (1970) citing 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES OF
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1836).
176. Id. at 71.
177. See LANDYNSKI supra note 130, at 40.
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seizure provision was necessary in view of the potential power of
the Federal Government to enforce its laws through general
warrants.
7 8
The First Congress delegated to Madison the task of drafting
the search and seizure amendment. His first draft of what would
become the fourth amendment read:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the
places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized. 7
The Committee to which the draft was referred altered it so
that it read:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized.'
Benson of New York wanted to make the provision stronger
by deleting the phrase "by warrants issuing" and substitute the
words "and no warrant shall issue" but his motion did not com-
mand a majority vote. Yet Benson's Committee reported his ver-
sion to the whole body, and it was this version which was adopted
and ultimately became the fourth amendment.8 8 Apparently, Ben-
son, the chairman of the Committee, manipulated the process to
report out his defeated version and managed to win approval.182
This chicanery does not change the fundamental purpose of
the amendment: to eliminate the abuse of power occasioned by
general warrants. The warrant clause speaks directly to the
178. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 41. Madison specifically adverted to the necessary
and proper clause as giving Congress the power to pass all laws necessary to collect its reve-
nue. Id. The scope of Congressional power to pass laws which were a means to the enact-
ment of its Constitutionally delegated powers was decided in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) See also, C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 309
(1928) (The Framers did not appreciate the scope of the necessary and proper clause.)
179. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 41.
180. Id.
181. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 41-42.
182. LASSON, supra note 145, at 101-03. See also, Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment:
The Reasonableness and the Warrant Clauses, 10 N.M.L. REV. 33, 38-41 (1980).
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problems associated with them. Scholars do not agree, however, on
the relationship between the reasonableness clause and the war-
rant clause. Jacob Landynski argued that the two clauses modified
each other. The warrant clause defined "reasonbleness" in terms of
probable cause and particularity, while the reasonableness clause
"reemphasized" the requirements of a valid warrant.1 83 He con-
cluded that because of this relationship the amendment prohibited
warrantless searches.184 Landynski argued that there were only two
exceptions to the warrant requirement which he combined within
the concept of emergencies: searches of moving vehicles and
searches incident to arrest of a person and the area around him."8 5
On the other hand, Telford Taylor contended that the Fram-
ers "were not at all concerned" with warrantless searches. '86 In-
stead,.the Framers were concerned with the oppressive use of the
search warrant and sought to put limits on the judicial power to
issue general warrants.1 87 Taylor believed that the Framers implied
acceptance of warrantless searches incident to arrest suggested
that they accepted their legitimacy. 8 8 At best, warrantless searches
must be kept within reasonable bounds. '89
Landynski's view saves the reasonableness clause from becom-
ing meaninglessness and preserves the protection of the warrant
clause. If warrantless searches are tested only by a rule of reasona-
bleness, then the strict requirements of the warrant clause are su-
perfluous. On the other hand, by defining reasonableness in terms
183. LANDYNSKI, supra note 130 at 42. Landynski argued that:
The first clause-"The right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated"-recognized as already existing a
right to freedom from arbitrary governmental invasion of privacy and did not seek
to create or confer such a right. It was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, in
some undefined way, strengthen) the requirements for a valid warrant set forth in
the second clause. The second clause in turn, defines and interprets the first, tell-
ing us the kind of search that is not "unreasonable," and therefore not forbidden,
namely, the one carried out under the safeguards there specified. Id. at 43.
184. Id. at 42-43. Landynski concluded that two correct interpretations of the amend-
ment were possible: (1) to be reasonable a search must meet the requirement of the warrant
clause or (2) a search which meets those requirements might still be unreasonable.
185. Id. at 44.
186. TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 43.
187. Id.; Cf. Force, The Bill of Rights and the Courts: Imperfect and Incomplete Pro-
tection of Human Rights in Criminal Cases, 56 TUL. L. REV. 148, 159-60 (1981).




of the warrant requirements, some meaning is imparted to an oth-
erwise vague standard. Nevertheless, Landynski's position presents
problems. for example, requiring warrants for all searches would
trivialize the warrant process."' 0 Moreover, although Landynski as-
serts that his two exceptions are "historically defined" only
searches incident to arrest can make that claim."" There is no in-
dication that the problem of searching moving vehicles was consid-
ered by the Framers at all. It was not until the invention of the
automobile that this exception came into being.'92 If these two sit-
uations are exceptions to the warrant clause they undercut
Landynski's position and tend to support Taylor's. That is, the
Framers recognized some warrantless searches. Therefore, it is con-
ceivable that the Framers would approve of other warrantless
searches so long as they were reasonable. It would follow, however,
that such warrantless searches might still be judged by the stan-
dards of probable cause and particularity.
93
In spite of their differences Landynski and Taylor agree on a
point fundamental to any new theory:' 9' the Framers intended to
prohibit general searches. 9 5 This is the "central concept" of the
amendment. By defining the evils of the general search it should
be possible to test modern-day intrusions into privacy by their re-
semblance to these evils. Such a delineation satisfies each of Gold-
berger's qualifications. General searches provide a gauge against
which modern searches can be measured. 9 a Modern day searches
190. Kitch, supra note 32, at 152.
191. TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 44-50.
192. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); See LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at
87-98.
193. Cf. Wilson, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 28
CATH. LAW. 173, 177 (1983) ("Although it is not obvious from the language alone, the antece-
dent history of the amendment makes it clear that the second clause was intended by the
Framers to provided a standard, though not necessarily the only standard, of what consti-
tutes a reasonable or an unreasonable search or seizure.").
194. See United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543, 570 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(balancing becomes a way to condone unconstitutional conduct); Burkoff, The Court That
Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine,
58 OR. L. REV. 151, 190-92 (1979).
195. TAYLOR, supra note 147, at 41; LANDYNSKI, supra note 130, at 20. See also Wein-
reb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 50 (1974) ("The central
theme of the amendment is its prohibition against general searches.")
196. Wasserstrom, supra note 101, at 303-04. (The Warrant Clause tells us what the
Framers meant to condemn).
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that resemble general searches to any significant degree should be
unreasonable under the amendment. Courts should compare the
objectionable features of general warrants with the search in
question.
III
The foregoing historical survey revealed the most objectiona-
ble features of the searches conducted pursuant to general war-
rants: their intrusiveness, their arbitrariness, their suppression of
free thought, and their invasion of the home. A judicial inquiry
based on these considerations would proceed along these lines:
A search must be limited in either time, space, or subject.
A search may not chill legitimate, particularly First Amend-
ment, activity.
A search must be carried out in a manner which minimizes
the intrusion upon an individual's person, home, or real
property.
A search may not discover an amount of wholly private in-
formation disproportionate to the information or evidence
of criminal activity or to the justification of the search.
The degree of justification for a search may vary in proportion
to the intrusiveness of search or the legitimate interests with which
it interferes but in any event may never be less than probable
cause.
This is not simply a balancing test where a court is asked to
take a multitude of factors into account and, in some mystical
fashion, arrive at a conclusion. Rather, this approach asks courts to
compare the search in question to the list above. If the search vio-
lates any of these norms then it is illegal under the fourth amend-
ment and evidence gathered pursuant to it should be sup-
pressed.19 7 To be sure, some of the factors are "softer" than others
but this ensures that courts will have the flexibility to deal with
new situations.
197. Forests have gone to the blade in the debate over the exclusionary rule. No more
trees should be felled in that cause, and, thus, this article will not address the efficacy of the
rule. Suffice it to say that in remedial Fourth Amendment law as well as in substantive
Fourth Amendment law cost-benefit analysis has no place.
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This approach would accommodate a good deal of modern
fourth amendment law but there also would be many changes. The
Katz cases would change the most. Because this theory takes a
common-sense approach to the definition of a search, this thresh-
old inquiry now prominent in many cases would disappear. In-
stead, the question would be whether the police acted reasonably.
This change would be particularly significant when a court con-
fronts a new surveillance or detection device. For example, Smith
v. Maryland would be reversed. The pen register was permanent, it
disclosed a great deal of information extraneous to the investiga-
tions, and had the potential to chill legitimate activity. Arguably, it
was not excessively intrusive because it did not physically invade
Smith's house nor did it disrupt his affairs. Additionally, the pen
register had the specific purpose of finding a certain number and
so it was not a "fishing expedition." On balance, however, the pen
register would be an unreasonable search unless authorized by a
warrant.
In similar fashion, the participant monitoring cases would be
reversed.19a This particular technique very closely resembles a gen-
198. See United States v. White, supra note 48; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), Lewis v. United States 385 U.S. 206 (1966); and Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963). In Hofla, the Court held that the fourth amendment did not prevent the use of an
informant's testimony at trial. Lewis similarly held that a police undercover officer who mis-
represented his identity while purchasing drugs from the defendant did not violate the
fourth amendment. Lopez held the fourth amendment was not violated by an informant
who secretly taped conversations with the defendant. The analysis should be the same
whether or not the informer is "wired" and whether he immediately broadcasts the conver-
sation or tapes it for later use. For an incisive critique of these cases, including White. See
Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth
Amendment Activities, Probable Cause and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMOLOGY 425, 435-38 (1978). Professor Weinreb has advanced the theory that the fourth
amendment protects the "privacy of presence." Weinreb, supra note 129, at 69. Privacy of
place protects our property; privacy of presence protects our person when we are in a pri-
vate place. Weinreb, supra note 129, at 69. Using this theory, Weinreb reconciles Katz and
White saying that the defendant in White couldn't invoke either protection. Weinreb supra
note 129, at 69 n.65. He concludes that Lewis was wrongly decided. Weinreb supra note 129
at 67. Under Weinreb's analysis, Lewis clearly could invoke the privacy of presence because
the transaction occurred inside of his house. Weinreb supra note 129, at 69. I agree with
Professor Weinreb on Lewis but disagree on the other cases. To the extent that the Su-
preme Court has created an enhanced zone of privacy when police intrude upon a house, the
court has adopted Professor Weinreb's approach. Compare Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740 (1984) (court reluctant to find circumstances to justify warrantless entry of home) and
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (warrantless beeper surveillance in a private
residence violates fourth amendment).
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eral search. It is open-ended on all counts, it intrudes not only into
a person's home but into his confidences, it typically reveals much
extraneous information, and, in particular, greatly chills legitimate
First Amendment activity. Professor Anthony Amsterdam made
this point when he equated participants-monitors, spies, and
electronic surveillance. He said:
I can see no significant difference between police spies, bugged or unbug-
ged, and electronic surveillance, either in their uses or abuses. Both have
long been asserted by law enforcement officers to be indispensable tools
investigating crime, particularly victimless and political crime, precisely
because they both search out privacies that government could not other-
wise invade. Both tend to repress crime in the same way, by making peo-
ple distrustful and unwilling to talk to one another. The only difference
is that under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk to anybody in
your office or over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to
talk to anybody at all. 99
Amsterdam goes on to describe his experience in the civil rights
movement when a group was confronted with the possibility of a
spy in their midst. After the group speculated as to the identity of
the spy, the group's leader suddenly said:
"Tell the people it was the bug. I made a mistake and said it on the
phone." The others were incredulous. He had never made that kind of a
mistake before. And how could he have sat there, letting them spill out
every suspicious circumstance they could think up about every move-
ment worker in the place, if it had been him? "Go and tell the people it
was the bug." They understood him and they went and told the people.
It had to be the bug. If it was a spy, the movement would have torn itself
apart.2
Only a narrowly circumscribed warrant founded upon probable
cause should authorize such practices. The warrant should be par-
ticular to the subject. That is, if an informer is to be used to inves-
tigate a certain crime his infiltration should be managed so that he
acquires information about that crime and little else.2°0 The war-
rant should state the information sought, the length of time the
informer will be undercover, and the means the informer plans to
199. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 407.
200. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 408.
201. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978). See also Morgan, supra note 12, at 94 (Spies more intrusive than bugs
becuase they can follow the subject from place to place). Morgan does not believe warrants
will be an effective tool, however. Morgan supra note 12, at 123.
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use. The warrant should be valid for a limited time but can be
renewed upon a sufficient showing.
The open fields cases, where the Court has held that a person
has no reasonable expectation of privacy outside of the curtilage, 0 2
would receive a different treatment. Strict application of this rule
would allow police investigative activity to occur on someone's
property no matter how invasive or damaging the activity was.2 3
Under the proposed new approach, whether or not the police tres-
passed would be a significant but not necessarily the controlling
factor.20 Other factors including the presence of probable cause,
the conduct of the police while on the property, and the extent of
the search would inform the court's judgement about the reasona-
bleness of an open fields search.
Two recent cases, where the open fields rule met with advanc-
ing technology, provide a good comparison between current fourth
amendment law and the proposed approach. 0 5 In Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States,06 the Court held that aerial photography of
a chemical plant from an aircraft lawfully in public navigable air-
space was not a fourth amendment search. State tort law protect-
ing such information was immaterial in defining the scope of the
fourth amendment. 0 7 Moreover, the court found that the photo-
graphs were not greatly intrusive because "[any person with an
202. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984). See generally Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth
Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1 (1986).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 473 F.2d 952, 954 (5th Cir. 1973) (Seizure of
suitcases buried next to chicken coop within open fields doctrine.); Conrad v. State, 63 Wis.
2d 616, 620-21 (1974) (Police trespassed, dug over a dozen holes in ground during random
search for a corpse); See Note, Katz In Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 485 (1983) for a
general discussion of the open fields doctrine which includes an analysis of the Circuit Court
opinion in Oliver.
204. Currently, confusion reigns as to importance of property doctrines in open field
and other cases. Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Defendant did not have
standing to challenge search because he didn't claim ownership on possession in items seized
on place searched) and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (Defendant did not have
standing to challenge search even though he owned the items seized). See also Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). (No search even though officers trespassed on property
because law of trespass protects different interests than Fourth Amendment).
205. See generally Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance After Ciraolo and Dow
Chemical: The Omniscient Eye in the Sky, 18 Loy. U. OF CHi. L. J. 285 (1986).
206. 106 S. Ct. at 1819 (1986).
207. 106 S. Ct. at 1823.
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airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate them" and
the photographs did not reveal "intimate details. ' 20 8 The open
spaces of the plant were not comparable to the curtilage of a dwell-
ing in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy but
were more like the open fields where any expectation of privacy is
unreasonable.2 0 9 The Court reserved the question whether or not
the use of highly sophisticated equipment "not generally available
to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitution-
ally proscribed absent a warrant."210
In California v. Ciraolo, 11 the court held that a warrantless,
naked-eye aerial observation of a marijuana patch in a fenced-in
back yard from aircraft lawfully in public navigable airspace was
not a search. Using the "voluntary exposure" rule, the court held
that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy be-
cause "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything" the police saw.
2 12
Justice Powell's dissent in both cases raised the fear that de-
veloping technology is eroding fourth amendment protections. In
Dow, Powell criticized the majority's nonchalance about the threat
of technology. Powell noted that fourth amendment interests are
measured by what a free society recognizes as reasonable and not
be the availability of the method of surveillance. 213 To do other-
wise would place privacy rights "seriously at risk as technological
advances become generally disseminated and available in our soci-
ety." 4 Powell echoed this view in Ciraolo.1 5 He went on to criti-
cize the majority's almost exclusive reliance on "the fact that
members of the public fly in planes and may look down at homes
as they fly over them. 21 6 The majority apparently found that be-
cause of this potential observation any expectation in backyard ac-
208. 106 S. Ct. 1823, n.126-127. But see 106 S. Ct. at 1829 n.4. (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting) (Camera cost over $22,000 and could resolve details as small as /2
inch in diameter).
209. 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
210. 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
211. 476 U.S. 207 reh'g denied 106 S. Ct. 3320 (1986).
212. 476 U.S. at 215.
213. 106 S. Ct. at 1833.
214. 106 S. Ct. at 1833.
215. 476 U.S. 217.
216. 476 U.S. at 219.
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tivities was unreasonable. Powell called this reasoning flawed be-
cause the potential for observation by passengers in commercial
aircraft was nil and because the activities observed occurred in pri-
vate. 1 7 There is a qualitative difference between the public use of
the airspace for business and pleasure and the low altitude over-
flights for the sole purpose of discovering information about a per-
son's activities "within a private enclave into which [the police]
were constitutionally forbidden" to enter without a warrant.
2 18
Under the approach proposed in this article there would be no
need to decide if the open fields doctrine applied or to resort to
tortured arguments about a business curtilage. 219 Rather, the ques-
tion, absent a properly issued warrant, is "is the search reasona-
ble?" There is no question that both overflights were searches. The
police in Ciraolo and the EPA in Dow purposefully flew over their
targets to gather information about the activities below. The flights
were not limited in duration or scope. The EPA conducted three
overflights of the Dow plant from distances of 12,000, 3,000, and
1,200 feet. 220 Both flights allowed indiscriminate access to informa-
tion about a range of activites not connected to the purpose of the
investigation. In Dow, the surveillance exposed the entire "open-
air" plants which included "reactor equipment, loading and storage
facilities, transfer lines, and motors located in the open areas be-
tween buildings.""22 In Ciraolo, the backyard included "a swim-
ming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activi-
ties." '222 Routine aerial surveillance may lead people to conclude
that they would not be safe from governmental snooping unless
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. In Ciraolo, the precise issue was whether or not aerial observation of the curtilage
violated the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987), the
Court outlines a four-part inquiry to determine if an area is within the curtilage of a resi-
dence: "the proximity of the area ... to the home, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
steps taken . . . to protect from observation" by passers by. Id. at 1139. In Dow, the com-
pany argued that the area photographed was within their "industrial curtilage" because it
had taken steps to bar access from ground level. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1825. The Court rejected
this argument saying that the area fell between the open fields and the curtilage but lacked
critical characteristics of both. 106 S. Ct. at 1825-26.
220. 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
221. 106 S. Ct. at 1828 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting).
222. 106 S. Ct. at 1817, n.7 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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"they retreat behind the walls of their homes" '223 and thus forego
other legitimate activities.
Unlike the majority's position, the availability of the technol-
ogy to the public or the potential for observation by others is im-
material. Assuming arguendo that the kind of camera used in Dow
is generally available,224 this would simply be beside the point. As
Professor Amsterdam noted, the government could not nullify the
fourth amendment by regularly announcing the existence of perva-
sive surveillance.226 Making the application of the fourth amend-
ment turn on the private availability of technology has the same
effect. In addition, my expectation of the nosiness or the lawless-
ness of others does not diminish my expectation that the govern-
ment will not gather information about me unless it has reason to
do so and follows the constitutionally prescribed procedures. If I
live in a high-crime area I still may expect that the government
will not barge into my house without a warrant.2 6 The question is
not whether or not there is a risk that some private party will dis-
cover information about me. Rather, the question is what risks we
should assume in a free society.227
In short, had the proposed approach been used in Dow and
Ciraolo the results would have been different. Aerial surveillance
has a place in law enforcement but its potential for abuse requires
that it be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Many of the searches currently recognized as exceptions to the
warrant clause would be reasonable under this approach. For ex-
ample, the result in "plain view" cases would be the same because
the seizure of evidence discovered in the course of otherwise lawful
police activity is reasonable. The leading plain-view case is Coo-
223. 106 S. Ct. at 1819, n.10 (Powell, J. dissenting).
224. The majority noted that the EPA did not use a "unique sensory device that...
could penetrate the walls of buildings and record the conversations [therein], but rather a
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in map-making," Dow, 106
S. Ct., at 1826. This statement ignores the cost of the camera and the incredible detail
revealed by the photographs. 106 S. Ct. at 1823 n. 126-127. Even if the availability of the
technology mattered, the majority's characterization of this technology was absurd.
225. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 384.
226. DiPippa, supra note 112, at 612, n.176 Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 406-07
(When a car is parked in a high crime area "does that mean government agents can break
into [the] car uncontrolled by the Fourth Amendment?").
227. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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lidge v. New Hampshire2 8 where the court held that evidence in
plain view may be seized if the police are lawfully on the premises.
The exact standard enunciated by Coolidge is not clear. Justice
Stewart outlined three requirements for the application of the
plain view rule. First, the police must be lawfully on the premises.
Second, they must inadvertently discover the item. Third, it must
be immediately apparent to them that the item is evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The Court mus-
tered five votes in favor of suppression, but Justice Harlan, who
provided the fifth vote in favor of suppression, did not join Stew-
art's opinion on the plain view issue.2 29 Recently, the Court gave
meaning to the "immediately apparent" language of Coolidge when
it held that the police must have probable cause to believe that the
item seized is connected to criminal activity.2 3 Whether or not the
discovery must be inadvertent is still an open question."'
The proposed approach would follow the current law. It would
be reasonable for the police to conduct plain view seizures because
they are limited both in scope and in the amount of information
which can be revealed and there is little chance that they will chill
legitimate activity. Under the proposed approach, the question of
inadvertance would be immaterial. The objective reasonableness of
the search and seizure should not depend on the subjective frame
of mind of the officer so long as the officer is where he belongs and
has probable cause to seize an item. The same can be said for
emergency searches.232
Most searches incident to arrest 233 would be reasonable.
Searches of the person and the area within his immediate control
should be generally sanctioned. Although the search is intrusive it
is limited in scope and will reveal an amount of information pro-
228. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), four members of the
court remarked that although Coolidge was a plurality opinion on the plain view issue it
should be a point of reference for any further discussion. On the other hand, five members
either implicitly or explicitly accepted the Coolidge formulation.
229. 403 U.S. at 490 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
230. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S . Ct. 1149 (1987).
231. 107 S. Ct. at 1155 (White, J., concurring).
232. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (Gravity of the underlying of-
fense important factor in determining exigency); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (Intrusiveness of search important factor).
233. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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portionate to its justification. The intensity of the search will be
limited by its justification. Thus, an arrest for a minor offense will
only justify a Terry-type frisk for the officer's protection.3 4
The bright-line rule in United States v. Robinson235 would be
reversed. Because in some cases the amount of private information
would be disproportionate to the evidence of criminal activity. For
example, the defendant in Robinson was stopped for a traffic viola-
tion but then was subjected to, first, a pat-down, and, then, a
search of his shirt pocket. Ultimately, the officer found a cigarette
package which contained contraband.2 " This search would fail
under the proposed approach because, absent evidence that the de-
fendant was dangerous or that he was engaged in illegal activity, a
search after a traffic stop will acquire information disproportionate
to the offense. Similarly, the bright-line rule of New York v. Bel-
ton237 also would be reversed. In Belton, the Court held that police
may make a search of the entire passenger compartment of an au-
tomobile and all of the containers found within it subject to lawful
custodial arrest.2 8 As a general rule under the proposed approach,
the search would be unreasonable because it is open-ended. That
is, unlike a search of a car conducted pursuant to the automobile
exception where the scope of the search is limited by its justifica-
tion, a Belton search automatically allows a search of the entire
passenger compartment in every case whether or not the police
have reason to believe they are in danger or that evidence of a
crime is hidden in the car. Moreover, Belton searches are intrusive
and will turn up a disproportionate amount of private information.
Automobile searches without warrants would still be allowed
although a few situations may come out differently. Chambers v.
Maroney a9 provides a good example. In Chambers, the Court up-
234. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (arrest for minor traffic
offense justifies search of arrestee's pocket) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Search of
person and its intensity determined by nature of situation.) See LaFave, "Case by Case
Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures"; The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT.
REV. 127, for the classic discussion of the problem of rules versus ad hoc decisions,.
235. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (Protection of the police and
preservation of the evidence are the twin justifications for searches incident to arrest).
236. 414 U.S. at 223.
237. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
238. 453 U.S. at 460.
239. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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held a warrantless search of an automobile.24 The opinion sug-
gested that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless
search because of the car's inherent mobility.24 1 The car, however,
had been driven to the police station and searched there after the
defendants had been taken into custody. 242 Thus, the facts of the
case undercut the mobility rationale. Although a later case stressed
mobility to overturn a decision upholding a search of an automo-
bile,243 more recent cases have reaffirmed Chambers and all but
eliminated mobility and exigency as necessary elements of the
doctrine.4
Recently the court further muddied the waters in California v.
Carney.24 In the course of holding that a search of a mobile motor
home parked in a downtown parking lot came under the automo-
bile exception the court remarked that "although ready mobility
alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle excep-
tion, our later cases made clear that ready mobility is not the only
basis for the exception. ' 246 The court noted a vehicle's reduced ex-
pectation of privacy because of its extensive regulation. 47 In spite
of these statements, the case turned on the mobility of the vehicles
in question because it was in a setting that objectively indicated its
use for transportation.248 The court reserved the question of
whether or not the vehicle exception applied to a motor home
more obviously and permanently used as a residence.249
My approach would revive exigency as an independent factor
in such cases. Because warrantless car searches resemble trespasses
on real property, because much extraneous information can be dis-
covered and because they chill legitimate activity, I would be hard
pressed to generally sanction them absent true mobility. To the
240. 399 U.S. at 52.
241. 399 U.S. at 51-52.
242. 399 U.S. at 44.
243. Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) (Justification for warrantless search
does not vanish when car stops); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (Reaffirming
Chambers).
244. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (Plurality rejected contention that
mobility had legal significance.
245. 471 U.S. at 386 (1985).
246. 471 U.S. at 391.
247. 471 U.S. at 392.
248. 471 U.S. at 394.
249. 471 U.S. at 394.
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extent that Carney considers the mobility of a vehicle and the in-
trusiveness of a search on property used as a home, it is consistent
with the proposed approach. 50 In any event, a clearer rationale
would emerge for automobile cases than currently exists.25
One category of cases deserves special treatment. Because the
fourth amendment is rooted in the Framer's distaste for the use of
general warrants to suppress political dissent, searches which may
potentially chill the exercise of First Amendment rights should re-
ceive rigorous scrutiny from the courts even if they are carried out
pursuant to a warrant.25 2 A warrant should be required in every
case. Even then, the government must show probable cause that
the group is involved in illegal activity which is dangerous to the
public safety.
253
This approach puts a premium on warrants. Even though the
Framers were fearful of the abuse of the warrant, they nevertheless
authorized its use after compliance with certain procedural and
substantive safeguards. When taken seriously and subjected to ju-
dicial scrutiny these safeguards should protect citizens from abu-
250. The rules respecting the warrantless search of containers located in vehicles as
defined in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) should stay the same. But see Katz,
United States v. Ross: Evolving Standards of Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMOLOGY 172 (1983).
251. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), where the Court phrased the
rationale as an exception to the warrant clause based on mobility and United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1976) where the court explained that the diminished expectation of
privacy in a car justified the automobile exception. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
(1973) (Automobiles not like other items because of extensive regulation.) See also Katz,
The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of A Public Place Exemption to the
Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE WESTERN REs. L. REV. 375 (1985-86).
252. Most of the current rules governing the interplay of the first and fourth amend-
ments arose from obscenity cases. The first amendment imposes special constraints on
searches for and seizures of presumptively protected material. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319, 326, n.5 (1979). The fourth amendment must be applied with "scrupulous
exactitude" in these circumstances. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). The seizure
of allegedly obscene material contemporaneous with or as an incident to an arrest for unlaw-
ful public exhibition may not be done without a warrant. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496,
497 (1972). Any warrant must be particularized and may not issue on the officers conclusory
assertions. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-732 (1961). But see Maryland v.
Macon, where the court applied the "voluntary disclosure" rule to find that an undercover
officer's purchase of material on display was not a search.
253. Cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) reh. denied 409 U.S. 901 (1973) (Court
dismissed complaint attacking military surveillance of civilian political activity but in dicta
suggested that when presented with facts showing specific injury courts could entertain
case).
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sive searches. If these conditions are met, then searches under war-
rant should be presumed reasonable unless carried out in a
patently unreasonable manner.3 4 The defendant should bear the
burden of proof to show that the judicial officer who issued the
warrant had no substantial basis for his conclusion.2 55 At the same
time, this approach does away with the good faith exception. 26
The police should not be able to rely on a search warrant that can-
not meet the above relaxed standard. Otherwise, one has the ab-
surdity of reasonable reliance upon a warrant which can not au-
thorize a reasonable search.23 7 Finally, the police would bear the
burden of proof whenever they conducted a warrantless search.
This would be similar but not identical to current law.258
CONCLUSION
The course of fourth amendment law has not often run
smoothly.2 9 This may be true no matter which approach is taken.
The difficulty lies in applying the Framer's hybrid normative and
practical judgment to an infinite variety of fact situations.2 0 Nev-
ertheless, by defining the Amendment's central values in func-
tional terms we may develop a jurisprudence that can adapt to our
technology and still be faithful to the Framer's purpose.
254. Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues,
67 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1982) (Courts should look at amount of force, time of day, and dura-
tion of the search).
255. Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213 (1983) reh. denied 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
256. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
257. The Court's apparent approval of this result in Leon and its companion case,
Massachusetts v. Shepherd, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), is a puzzle. The question is whether a
warrant invalid under the objective reasonable standard of Gates could still be relied upon
by objectively reasonable police officers. Justices Brennan and Marshall referred to this
question as mind-boggling. If a warrant invalid under Gates is unreasonable under the
fourth amendment, then Leon/Shepherd add nothing except confusion to the Gates deci-
sion. Cf. Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause, Good Faith", and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REv. 551,
589 (1984) ("To say that the evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be admissible
even though police lacked a 'substantial basis' for a 'substantial chance' of criminal activity
as long as they had a reasonable belief that they had a 'substantial basis' for a 'substantial
chance' would be to promulgate an almost mind-boggling standard.") (emphasis in original).
258. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).
259. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J. concurring);
see LaFave, Search & Seizure, The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . . Run Smooth,
1966 U. ILL. LAW FORUM 255.
260. Amsterdam, supra note 46, at 411.
